General Quarters


Don Kovacs RD3 1966-68 came up with a great idea to have some of the crew from his era submit memories of their experiences on the gun line during our time in Viet Nam. Don starts with a brief history of General Quarters followed by excerpts from some of the crew.


When the call to General Quarters (GQ) is made the crew prepares the ship to join battle. All hands report to their battle stations and prepare for action. While the term “General Quarters” is used in navies such as ours other navies, such as the Royal Navy use the term “Action Stations”. The French use the term “Aux postes de combats” (to combat stations) and used to “branie-bas de combat”  literally meaning that sleeping hammocks should be cleared off the gunnery deck, folded and piled on the upper boarders of the ship as protection for the crew.

Historically a drum pattern called “the beat to quarters” was played to signal the crew. A drum signal was a three second drum roll with two beats between the rolls. “GQ” involved cleaning the main gun decks by taking all extraneous gear and equipment storing it down in the hold. All canons were primed and loaded with ammunition. It was common during times of earlier war for ships to beat to quarters before dawn as the enemy was quite often sighted during sunrise. Drum beats were replaced in the 20th century by klaxons or bells. “GQ” was traditionally called when the ship may face danger beyond that which is typically expected of them when at sea. Quarters was called during battles, storms or even random sightings in fog. The general philosophy is that of preparedness.

All sailors are assigned their “GQ” stations upon being accepted as a crew member even on today’s modern military vessels. Once “GQ” is called a “roll call” is made and any additional change to station may be made based on the nature of the situation calling the “GQ” alarm. The original bell signal for “beating to quarters” was a rapid sequence of the bell five times at five second repeats. Today the “GQ” alarm is a rapidly repeating electronic klaxon bell signal rung in the same manner. There are different klaxon signals for different conditions such as chemical warfare, nuclear attack and many others.

During the period of 15 June 1966 to 6 September 1968 sailors of the DeHaven were quite familiar with this call accompanied by the blowing of the boatswain mates whistle to prepare them for battle. It was this period of time the DeHaven conducted sustained combat operations in Southeast Asia operating off the coasts of both South and North Vietnam. It was this period that “Destroyer Squadron Nine” was awarded the “Navy Unit Commendation Ribbon” by the Secretary of the Navy. It was the first destroyer squadron in naval history to be awarded this ribbon. The following articles have been drafted by some of our sailors aboard the DeHaven during the combat support missions conducted between 1966 and 1968.

 

Jim Auer LT
I was the GQ OOD.  The runs in off the coast of North Vietnam to attack North Vietnamese waterborne logistics craft [WBLC] were quite a challenge.  The small WBLCs were not a threat to DEHAVEN; however, the 100 mm North Vietnamese shore batteries which could outdistance our 5”38s. Fortunately the Soviets did not give the North Vietnamese  multiple fire control radars to go with the guns.  For such operations we always kept four boilers on the line and turned away at flank speed when we received counter battery from North Vietnamese coastal sites. The engineers knew that a flank bell meant we were under fire and gave us what seemed like 110% of max power. 

Captain Franz minimized personnel on the exposed port and starboard wings of the bridge so QM3 Mike Conneely, my phone talker, and I were often the only two on either side.  Particularly memorable was one occasion when we came under fire from multiple North Vietnamese coastal sites simultaneously.  Mike and I could see the splashes from the 100 mms landing ahead of us [in waters through which we had to pass through to clear the beach] so our primary hope was that fishtailing [which is quite exciting at 31 knots] would prevent DEHAVEN from getting hit. 

All of a sudden the small island on our starboard side [which the carrier’s computer printout we had received by radio message a day earlier said had no guns on it] opened up as well.  But, noticing that there were no splashes to starboard from the island’s guns which meant they were likely not 100 mms, I decided to close the island as we continued to clear the beach.  Acting Weapons Boss Jim Chapman was in Director 51 which locked on the island in range and Mike and I fed him accurate visual bearings directly to the island sites.  The island was almost directly abeam when Jim began a series of six guns salvos.   The first salvo from Mounts 51 and 52 sent a four gun shock wave across the starboard bridge wing knocking Mike and me on our backs, a moment I can remember like it was yesterday.  The accuracy of our six 5”38s destroyed the guns on the island and an almighty God allowed DEHAVEN to fishtail safely from the North Vietnamese shore batteries.  
 
Amazingly accurate guns, a fantastic CIC RADAR/ECM team, a powerful engineering plant and supply guys who kept hardworking sailors well fed made DEHAVEN  a mighty fighting force.

Dave Looker BT2
GQ Station:   As A young 17 year old aboard ship I was assigned to the aft fireroom. My 1st GQ Station on the ship was mount 53 magazine. I think there was 3 or 4 of us in the magazine.Our job was to pass projectiles and powder shells up from the magazine through a 6 or 7 inch hole in the deck to the personnel below the mount. If I remember the 5 inch 38 projectiles weighed about 56 lbs and powder a little less. So depending on how many rounds were fired it didn’t take  long to tire out and it was always very warm in those magazines. If there was a brake in the action I can tell you its possible that you can sleep on the top of those very same projectiles you worked so hard handling up through that hole in the deck above you. Serving aboard the Dehaven was a very hard but rewarding experience and helped turn a young 17 year old into a better man and forged some life long friendships.

Mike Snyder RD2
One day early in our first cruise off the coast providing gunfire support I was asked to take over the duties as Radio Telephone (RT) talker to the spotter.  The spotter was almost always “Salted Flakes 26 C.”

We would go to GQ and I would man the RT headphones to communicate with the spotter and he would relay a set of eight number coordinates for our shore fire charts.  We would plot in CIC and get a rough idea of where our target was located. He also gave us a description of the target, VC in the open, a bunker complex, troops in contact requesting naval gunfire support. 

After CIC had plotted the position the quartermaster who plotted the same target information on the Bridge gunfire chart and CIC would confirm that the plots matched to minimize the chance of firing on friendlies (a little more on that later). This backup system gave us some hope of not making a huge mistake.  When all was in agreement onboard, projectile time of flight, and any other information required by the spotter, we would give the spotter a “Ready.” 

At that point the spotter would request a round of “Willy Pete” for smoke to mark the target which I would announce was on the way by giving a “Shot” on the radio to the spotter.  After finding the smoke hopefully close to the target, it usually was, he would adjust the impact point with something like left 100, drop 100.  After giving him a “Ready” we would fire another round for spotting, letting him know we have fired when I transmitted the word “Shot”again.  If no further adjustments were required he would then ask for so many guns, so many rounds to be fired on the designated target.  Sometimes Salted Flakes would give us a damage report sometimes not.  We could have multiple targets in the spotter’s area and we would shift targets using the same process on each new target.

Now for a little more of the (“More on that Later".)  One mission I have always thought about was a situation where both the quartermaster on the bridge and CIC plotted the wrong position using the same coordinates.  When we compared plots and agreed on the target we fired a spotting round.  No luck, spotter couldn’t see smoke. Hey it happens we are firing into a jungle.  We fired a fired a second round, no luck, fired a third same story. Salted Flakes gave us a cease fire to check plots.  CIC and Bridge reviewed the plots, spotter said give him another round and we fired again.  Same result no smoke.  The spotter and the ship couldn’t figure out what was going on.  Then old Salted Flakes said cease fire I think I see the problem.  A few minutes later he reports that our rounds are way off the designated target he has spotted smoke in the area well to the south.  Yep it was us.  Both CIC and the Quartermaster had plotted the target wrong but plotted it in the same wrong spot.  Took us awhile to live that one down

Don Kovacs RD3
I served on board USS DeHaven DD-727 from 1966 through 1968. I was fortunate to have been assigned to the “ELINT” team (electronics intelligence) very early in the game. We had no active jamming capabilities but functioned entirely as a passive element in the overall picture in the combat information center commonly referred to as CIC”. The navy in 1966 started to take a real close look at the benefits of electronic counter measures intelligence (ECM) and decided to devote a full team to the squadron to aggressively pursue this aspect of both threat evaluation and warfare. The best part of being on this team was our trips to Fuchu, Japan for debriefing after deployment. The air force had a great base up there and they treated us like kings! The food was far superior to what we were accustomed to and the accommodations were equal to those found at any Ritz Carlton!

The major emphasis quickly shifted from the routine and quite often mundane task of listening and plotting radar systems locations to that of plotting the fire control radar systems. The dynamic interest was now in the surface to surface threat capabilities north of the DMZ. We were told to keep our eyes and ears open for the more advanced acquisition systems with true surface to surface attack seeking footprints.

The degree of concern for these advanced systems had somewhat heightened in a relatively short period of time. The Navy initially believed that the fleet and its squadron elements should have no concern at all. They felt we could steam anywhere we wanted to without any threat of reprisal. That was about to change in a very big way. A few rounds of high explosive lobbed by the enemy every now and then was a sustainable threat and we could continue running with the limited risks they believed to exist. The thought of a surface ship being “whacked” by a missile had a lot of people concerned. All of a sudden the easy “ELINT” duty became more like work. Port and starboard duty just about killed all of us. The entire ship had to pay attention when we steamed north of the DMZ or suffer the consequences of the unknown. A vigilant watch was maintained for all fire control systems. It was our team who advised the bridge that the enemy was making a defined electronic effort to “lock on” and gain target acquisition. This meant they were just seconds away from lobbing or launching their best weapon of choice!

The majority of times the North Vietnamese simply lobbed some junk at us. A higher degree of sophistication concerned us since “lobbing and launching” are two different modes of transportation. The team continued its watch for this surface threat from the fire control radar systems. The thought of going from a three minute warning and dealing with counter battery artillery fire to less than a handful of seconds to a missile launch was scary.

I believe it all came together on or about September 13, 1967. It was the run north of the “DMZ” with the cruiser USS Boston CAG-1 and the destroyer USS Damato DD-871. The USS DeHaven DD-727 was to be the third ship in line functioning as the “counter battery” element only. This mission would place us between the beach and Hon Mat Island itself! We were so close you could spit and hit the island. During this run we finally intercepted the fire control radar system we had been looking for. The North Vietnamese had actually locked on the DeHaven! It was a very bad feeling knowing we were in such a confined position while in this run receiving continuous fire from the North Vietnamese shore batteries. I also remember I could hear just how close those shells were hitting the water around us.

For the North Vietnamese the “Fan Song” radar system was their platform of choice. This was the fire control radar typically used in concert with the “Silkworm” missile launch. This is what we had so diligently looked for and this was what we had finally found. If there is one thing and one thing only that I learned in the Navy it was about team work. Those individuals whose responsibility was keeping our equipment up and running were to be commended. Without our equipment functioning top notch the ship would be like a blind or deaf person meandering around in the dark. From the engine room came the power to drive us through each run. I don’t know how those guys did it. Being down in the bowels of the ship was truly a hostile environment! Each and every sailor was a vital element reflecting our success.

We were so close to the source they could have thrown that missile as though it was a spear! The launch now seemed to be imminent. How could they possibly miss? We were only seconds away from intercepting the carrier signal of a “silkworm missile” meaning the beast was en route and we had zero maneuvering room. The DeHaven now shifted into high gear. I can honestly testify that I had never seen such an astonishing group of people (the crew) function in such an incredible focused way. This is what we had trained for and this was our defining moment in time. It was a beautiful thing to be part of and one which I personally will never forget. The “ELINT” team shifted from normal operating speed to light speed and advised both Boston and Damato of our intercept and within a minute of authentication by both the maneuver to escape was executed. I can honestly say it seems to have simply been an “electronic blur.” We pitched, rolled and yawed but we never faltered! Was DeHaven going to be taken as “first prize” by the North Vietnamese? If they did hit us with a missile would there be any of us left to tell our story? All that training, the blood, sweat and tears each crew member gave to be the “best of the best” was a reflective reminder that we were all part of the DeHaven and the DeHaven was in fact us.

Needless to say DeHaven, Boston and the Damato managed to get in and out alive. Once we knew the North Vietnamese had successfully locked on DeHaven we elected not to make another pass down that same beach. Luck and skill was on our side that day. A great deal was learned from that adventure and there was a new strategy developed shortly thereafter. The consensus of opinion by the combat strategists was to stay further away from such a viable threat and so it was for the entire fleet. That signal was never intercepted again.

I often look back at that two year period of time and know that we had truly become a part of history. Very few will ever understand the devotion and dedication that all gave during that specific time frame. This “rag tag” team of sailors did exactly what they were trained to do.

The sailors of the DeHaven before us knew as we now know and for those who will “man their battle stations” in the future, we were there and we served with honor. I have learned to treasure that past experience understanding that its worth can only be measured in the friendship with those who gave so much wanting so little in return. It will serve me well with the stories I’ll spin for my grandkids and anyone else who will listen.

Randy Jones MM3
I had two GQ stations. The first one was in the Mount 51 magazine. I’ll never forget loading powder and projectiles and thinking about the damage they would do when they hit their targets. Other than that, it wasn’t too bad. At least it wasn’t noisy and hot. And if we had taken a hit in the magazine we wouldn’t have known it.
 
I guess I was beginning to show a little promise because I was moved from the magazine to a Damage Control Team where I stationed myself inboard of the MG Unit in the main passageway waiting for incoming rounds to do damage so we could fix it. We tuned our ears to hear both real and imaginary incoming rounds explode. In both the magazine and the Damage Control Team there was a lot of talk about the latest rumors and what we would do the next time we got liberty.

Looking back I’d say we were pretty much starving for the information the operations people had. I wasn’t the only one who was shocked and sickened when one of the Destroyers we were with took direct hits and lives were lost. We could only imagine what it looked like while our shipmates above deck were watching it all.
 
I moved from the Damage control team to the engine room as an oiler. I soon moved to the throttles and they eventually became my GQ station. In the engine room we were even further removed from what seemed like the real world above. The bridge would give us bells and we would answer them knowing how vital it was to be precise and respond quickly. It was good to know I was now doing a job that meant my Chief and my shipmates had a level of trust in me. The throttles were also nice because there was more information about what was going on and there was fresh air blowing on me from outside.
 
 
Scott Martin BT3
Although I was a BT, my GQ station was mount 51 magazine. A typical GQ would go like this:

  • Open the hatch and decend into themagazine
  • Open up the door to powder magazine
  • Begin loading the hoist/s with powder and projectiles to populate the merry-go-round, the storage for projectiles and powder immediately under the gun mount. This required 80 rounds of both and was the most labor intensive part of the start of GQ.

A crew outside the merry-go-round would have to open the powder cans and remove the charge. The types of projectile rounds would be passed along from the mount and shouted down the hoist from above.

During GQ, we would continue to send up ammunition as called for. After GQ the merry-go-round would be emptied and all the powder and projectiles returned to storage in the magazine. At times, depending on the shooting frequency, this can be a very labor intensive GQ station. During extended GQ situations, we would sometimes relieve the projectile loader and powder loaders in the gun mount where it really got busy.

One huge advantage of this station was the location immediately below Chief’s berthing. If there was an extended lull in the action, the magazine crew (usually 3 people) could climb up into Chief’s berthing where it was air-conditioned and maybe relax in one of the racks. One might even find some suitable reading material under one of the matteresses.

George Corbett RM3
One memory was of going up a river - I think the Saigon River to support an operation.  Two things I remember about that trip was I think we were taking some small arms fire from the shore and then a mortar fired a couple of rounds.  Then, for the only time I ever witnessed, we fired all six guns at one time - it was to the port side - the ship rocked from that volley and it cleared an opening in the jungle about a 1/4 mile wide for as far as you could see.  No more small arms fire or mortar.

Ken Columbia YN2
So far, I remember I had two, the first as a deckhand I was in Mount 52 as the ammo guy – taking the bullets out of the hoist and dropping them into the left gun after the powder keg was put in the breach; then I would hit the lever and it all would get loaded into the barrel.  I did that for about two years during the heaviest part of our NGFS and when we were being shot at.  The second, when I went into the ship’s office/weapons yeoman I was on the bridge and manning the captain’s sound-powered phone, from CIC I think.

George Hofius RD3
During GQ I would race to combat (CIC) where I could do several jobs:

1. Status Board. Status Board is a Plexiglas Board where aircraft and ships positions was written. We wrote this backward so the officers could read this information quickly and accurately.

2. Radar repeater and tracer board. I could take radar information, follow and plot the DRT (Dead Reckoning Tracer).

3. My primary job was ECM (Electronic Counter Measures), listening for enemy/friendly radars triangulating our ships position. This information was forwarded to the Bridge/Artillery alerting to the possibilities of being shot at.

Bob Yapp ETN2
clipAs an ET my GQ station was to support the communications gear in Radio Central and the transmitters across the passageway in the Radio Transmitter room. But one memorable day in the midst of heavy firing the guns stopped shooting and I was called to the bridge for an emergency repair.

There was a temporary antenna that was mounted above the bridge and immediately behind mount 52 (pictured left) that had vibrated loose during the firing. It was hanging precariously from just one mounting bolt.
No problem I thought to myself as I quickly got some replacement bolts to remount the antenna.

I had just finished tightening the last bolt when...BOOM!  The guns let loose. I grabbed my tools with ears ringing gave the guys on the sound powered phones watching me the finger for the nice wakeup call and got below to my GQ station in record time! 

Copyright © 1997-2023

USS DeHaven Sailors Association
2606 Jefferson Avenue, Joplin MO 64804

Contact Us